Fertility in Eastern Europe: Moldova at 1.73 children per woman, above the EU average of 1.34

The world is approaching the replacement threshold; Eastern Europe has long been below it

The total fertility rate worldwide stood at 2.188 children per woman in 2024, according to the World Bank, compared with 2.517 in 2014 — a loss of 0.329 children, or 13.1% over a decade. The global average is thus approaching the conventional generational replacement threshold, situated at around 2.1 children per woman in low-mortality populations.

In Eastern Europe, almost all of the countries analysed were below this threshold throughout the 2014-2024 period; the sole exception was Georgia, which recorded 2.18 children per woman in 2014 and only fell below 2.1 in 2018 (2.093). In 2024 none of the six countries analysed (Bulgaria, Georgia, Moldova, Poland, Romania, Ukraine) reached 1.9 children per woman. The European Union, taken as an aggregate, fell to 1.341 — the lowest level in the entire 2014-2024 series and 0.197 below its 2014 level (1.538).

The gap between the world average and the EU average thus reached 0.847 children per woman in 2024. In other words, the global indicator is roughly 63% higher than that of the European Union.

The 2024 ranking: from 1.80 in Georgia to 0.99 in Ukraine

In 2024 the regional ranking was led by Georgia (1.802 children per woman), followed by Moldova (1.726) and Bulgaria (1.72). At the other end stands Ukraine, at 0.988 children per woman — the only country in the group below the symbolic threshold of one child per woman.

The distance between the extremes is 0.814 children per woman, meaning that Georgia's fertility is 82% higher than Ukraine's. Between the two lie Romania (1.39), the EU aggregate (1.341) and Poland (1.14).

Moldova's position is notable: although it has one of the lowest levels of GDP per capita in the group (18,661.7 PPP USD in 2024, virtually on a par with Ukraine — 18,636.1 — and against an EU average of 63,808.1 PPP USD, according to the World Bank), it remains second in terms of fertility. A level of 1.726 nevertheless represents approximately 82% of the generational replacement threshold — insufficient to stabilise population numbers without positive net migration.

Romania and Poland: the fastest recent declines

The most rapid recent change in the region occurred in Romania: from 1.81 children per woman in 2021 to 1.39 in 2024, a fall of 0.42 (-23.2%) in three years. The entire increase accumulated between 2014 (1.56) and 2021 (+0.25) has been wiped out, and the 2024 level is 0.17 below that of a decade ago.

Poland embarked on this downward path earlier: from a peak of 1.48 in 2017, the rate fell steadily to 1.14 in 2024, the lowest value among the EU states in the group analysed (-0.34 compared with 2017). The decline has been uninterrupted in every year since 2018.

Ukraine represents a distinct case: the fall from 1.148 in 2021 to 0.897 in 2022 coincides with the full-scale invasion, followed by a fragile stabilisation at 0.977 in 2023 and 0.988 in 2024. Demographic data for Ukraine during the war must be read with caution, since mass population displacement affects both the numerator and the denominator of the indicator.

The only exception to the regional trend is Bulgaria: 1.72 children per woman in 2024, 0.10 more than in 2014 (1.62). It is the only country in the group with a positive balance over the decade, although the 2023 level (1.81) already suggests a downward inflection.

Moldova: a slow decline from an already sub-threshold base

Moldova declined from 1.82 children per woman in 2014 to 1.726 in 2024, that is -0.094 (-5.2%) — the slowest decline in the group, after the Bulgarian exception. The trajectory is not linear, however: after a peak of 1.89 in 2016, the indicator fell to 1.694 in 2022, rose to 1.731 in 2023 and returned to 1.726 in 2024.

The relative stability of the rate does not amount to demographic stability. A rate of 1.726 sustained over the long term implies a contraction of each successive generation, compounded by the effect of emigration on the population of childbearing age — a factor that the fertility rate, as an intensity indicator, does not capture.

Georgia illustrates the risk of rapid convergence: from 2.18 children per woman in 2014 (above the replacement threshold) to 1.802 in 2024, a loss of 0.378 (-17.3%) over a decade. A country can move from "high" fertility for the region to European levels in less than ten years.

Money and children: a correlation that does not explain everything

The 2024 data do not confirm any simple relationship between income and birth rates within the region. Poland, with 51,262.5 PPP USD per capita, has 1.14 children per woman; Moldova, with 18,661.7 PPP USD — 2.7 times less — has 1.726. Ukraine, with a GDP per capita almost identical to Moldova's (18,636.1 PPP USD in 2024), has the lowest fertility in the group, at 0.988.

The Moldova-Ukraine pairing is instructive precisely because it eliminates the income hypothesis: at similar living standards, the difference of 0.738 children per woman points to factors of security, population displacement and uncertainty, not to differences in GDP. The correlation between income and fertility, where it appears, should not be read as causation.

A second element of context for Moldova is its dependence on remittances: these fell from 22.079% of GDP in 2014 to 10.533% in 2024 and 9.406% in 2025 (the latest year available in the World Bank series). More than halving the share of transfers from abroad changes the income structure of households with members working overseas, but the available data do not allow a direct link with fertility decisions to be established.

Implications for Moldova

Planning the public service network. At 1.726 children per woman in 2024, below the 2016 peak of 1.89, sizing the network of nurseries, kindergartens and schools becomes an exercise in cohort projection rather than in maintaining existing capacity.

Benchmarking against a realistic regional reference. Moldova is not a case of "low" fertility by comparison with its neighbours — it ranks second out of six in 2024 — but its level remains around 18% below the replacement threshold. Policy objectives framed solely by reference to the EU average (1.341) risk overstating the country's real position.

The sensitivity of projections to migration. With sub-threshold fertility levels across the region, population trends depend predominantly on the net migration balance. Any long-term budgetary scenario — pensions, health, education — requires explicit migration assumptions, not merely birth-rate assumptions.

The quality of demographic data. Discrepancies between international and national estimates, as well as uncertainty over the resident population, limit the precision of any quantitative target. Consolidating administrative registers remains a precondition for evaluable demographic policies.

Sources

• World Bank, World Development Indicators
• National Bureau of Statistics of Moldova, statistical databank