Remittances: Moldova at 9.4% of GDP in 2025, below Georgia and 10.9 times the EU average

The 2025 ranking: Moldova, the second most dependent economy in the group

In 2025, remittances received were equivalent to 9.41% of GDP in the Republic of Moldova, according to World Bank data. This is the second-highest figure in the group analysed, after Georgia (11.17%), and well above Romania (2.48%), Bulgaria (2.11%), Poland (0.91%) and the European Union average (0.86%).

The gap with the EU remains an order of magnitude wide: Moldova's share is roughly 10.9 times the European average and 10.3 times Poland's. Against Romania — the most relevant institutional and linguistic comparison — the ratio is 3.8 to 1.

No figure is available for Ukraine for 2025 in the World Bank series; the latest year available is 2024, at 6.29% of GDP, down from 10.36% in 2022, the first year of the full-scale invasion. The comparison with Ukraine must therefore be read across different years.

The 2014–2025 trajectory: a 57% decline in Moldova, stagnation in Georgia

The twelve-year series shows Moldova slowly converging towards regional patterns. In 2014, remittances represented 22.08% of GDP — twice the level recorded in Georgia (11.06%) that same year. By 2025 the share had fallen to 9.41%, a reduction of 12.67 percentage points, or 57.4% in relative terms.

Georgia followed the opposite path: from 9.58% in 2015 it rose to a peak of 15.42% in 2022, then eased to 11.17% in 2025, still slightly above its 2014 level. Georgia overtook Moldova for the first time in 2022 (15.42% against 14.03%), and in 2025 the difference is 1.76 pp in Georgia's favour.

Romania and Bulgaria fluctuated within a narrow band throughout the period: Romania between 2.48% (2025) and 3.26% (2019), Bulgaria between 2.11% (2025) and 3.52% (2017). Poland declined almost continuously after 2016, from 1.43% to 0.91% in 2025 — close to the EU average (0.86%).

Why the share is falling: the denominator is growing faster

The indicator is a ratio, and its decline does not automatically mean that diaspora flows have shrunk in absolute terms — the series used do not contain dollar amounts, only shares of GDP. Arithmetically, a falling share may reflect either smaller flows or GDP growing faster.

The second mechanism is documented by the data: Moldova's GDP per capita at purchasing power parity rose from 8,643 international dollars in 2014 to 19,996 in 2025 (+131.3%), according to the World Bank. Over the same period, Romania's GDP per capita climbed from 20,633 to 50,895 international dollars (+146.7%), and Georgia's from 11,771 to 29,414 (+149.9%).

In parallel, average gross monthly earnings in Moldova rose from €219.5 in 2014 to €796.0 in 2025, according to the NBS — an increase of 262.6%. The relationship between domestic wages and external flows nonetheless remains a matter of macroeconomic context rather than a causal link demonstrable with the present data: we have no series on the number of migrants, destinations or informal transfer channels.

Low inequality, low incomes: the Moldovan paradox

On income distribution, Moldova leads the regional ranking in the positive sense: the Gini index stood at 26.8 in 2023, the lowest among the countries compared with data for that year — below Poland (28.5), Romania (29.8) and 12.7 points below Bulgaria (39.5). Georgia recorded 33.9 in 2024, and Ukraine 25.6 in its latest available year, 2020 — a lower value, but from an earlier year and therefore not directly comparable.

Relative equality does not, however, mean prosperity. In 2025, the absolute poverty rate in Moldova was 31.1% nationally and 40.0% in rural areas (21.1% in urban areas), according to the NBS. No direct comparison with the EU is possible: the European AROPE indicator (at risk of poverty or social exclusion), for which the EU-27 recorded 20.9% in 2025 and Romania 27.4%, does not cover the Republic of Moldova in the Eurostat database.

A second structural gap concerns the labour market. The ILO-estimated unemployment rate for Moldova was 1.51% in 2025, against 5.93% in the EU and 12.10% in Georgia. The figure should be read with caution: for the same year the NBS reports an ILO-definition unemployment rate of 3.9% for the 15–64 age group, an employment rate of 50.3% and an inactivity rate of 47.7%. Low unemployment largely reflects a numerically small labour force rather than a saturated labour market.

Implications for Moldova

A smaller share of remittances in GDP mechanically reduces the exposure of domestic consumption and budget revenues to external shocks — recessions in host countries, currency depreciations or mobility restrictions. Monitoring should nonetheless track absolute values and transfer channels, not only shares, in order to distinguish between a "larger economy" and "smaller flows".

The comparison with Georgia shows that the level of dependence does not converge automatically towards the European average: over the same period in which Moldova's share fell by 57%, Georgia's remained above 11% of GDP. The relevant policy scenario is therefore one of managed transition, not inevitable evolution.

The combination of low inequality (Gini of 26.8 in 2023) and high absolute poverty (31.1% in 2025) points to an income profile compressed at a low level. In such a distribution, classic redistributive instruments have limited effect; raising labour incomes and the employment rate — 50.3% for the 15–64 age group in 2025 — carries greater explanatory weight.

For international comparability on poverty and social exclusion, Moldova's absence from the Eurostat AROPE series remains a limitation: without this indicator, the gap with Romania (27.4% in 2025) or with the EU-27 (20.9%) cannot be quantified directly.

Sources

• World Bank, World Development Indicators
• Eurostat database
• National Bureau of Statistics of Moldova, statistical database